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 close family member is diagnosed with late-stage 
breast cancer and now only has a fifteen percent 
chance of survival.  She soon dies.  Prior to her 
diagnosis, she had routine screenings every two years, but her 
previous doctor failed to detect the then existing cancer when she 
would have had a fifty percent chance of survival.  In New 
Hampshire, from a legal standpoint, there has been no wrong.1 
This legal concept of negligent medical care that causes a 
patient to have a lower percentage of survival, or a less favorable 
outcome, is referred to as the “loss of opportunity” or “loss of 
chance doctrine.”2  Generally, acceptance of the loss of opportunity 
doctrine has been limited to medical malpractice cases. 3   Some 
courts and scholars have considered extending the loss of 
opportunity doctrine to other contexts, such as to legal malpractice,4 
or to those who fail to contact emergency help, 5  but with little 
success.   
In restricting loss of chance exclusively to medical 
malpractice in Massachusetts, the state supreme court identified four 
reasons why the loss of chance doctrine is “particularly well suited” 
for medical malpractice cases: (1) the high reliability of expert 
evidence; (2) the expectation that the doctor will “take every                                                         
1 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:2(III) (2010) (stating a defendant cannot 
recover in a medical malpractice case for the loss of opportunity deprived by a 
doctor). 
2 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 (2010).  While N.H. courts use the 
phrase, “loss of opportunity doctrine,” most other courts and literature use the 
phrase, “loss of chance doctrine.”  See, e.g., Matsuyama v. Birnbaum, 890 N.E.2d 
819, 823 (Mass. 2008).  See generally Lord v. Lovett, 770 A.2d 1103 (N.H. 2001).  
Therefore, in writing this note, I use the phrase, “loss of opportunity doctrine,” 
unless specifically referring to law from other states or literature. 
3 Lord, 770 A.2d at 1104–05 (“The loss of opportunity doctrine, in its many forms, 
is a medical malpractice form of recovery. . . .”); see, e.g., Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d 
at 834–35 (explicitly limiting the loss of chance doctrine to medical malpractice 
cases). 
4 George S. Mahaffey Jr., Cause-In-Fact and the Plaintiff’s Burden of Proof with 
Regard to Causation and Damages in Transactional Legal Malpractice Matters: 
The Necessity of Demonstrating the Better Deal, 37 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 393, 425 
(2004). 
5 Blinzler v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 81 F.3d 1148, 1152 (1st Cir. 1996). 
A 
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reasonable measure” to ensure a favorable outcome; (3) the nature of 
a patient seeking medical care (i.e., patients have pre-existing 
conditions) can make proving the causation element impossible; and 
(4) the doctor is in a better position to prevent the harm of his or her 
own negligence.6  For these reasons, the court joined other courts 
throughout the country in limiting the loss of chance doctrine to 
medical malpractice cases.7 
The focus of this note is to suggest that New Hampshire take 
a second look at the loss of opportunity doctrine.  While some 
drawbacks to adopting the doctrine exist, the advantages outweigh 
the disadvantages.  In coming to this conclusion, among other things, 
this note considers the reasons offered by the N.H. Legislature in 
abrogating the N.H. Supreme Court’s decision to adopt the loss of 
opportunity doctrine.  However, contrary to what the legislature 
suggested, the doctrine does not appear to increase litigation or 
insurance premium rates.  Therefore, this note implores the N.H. 
Legislature to re-evaluate its decision. 
I. THE ORIGINS OF THE DOCTRINE 
 
 Before discussing the merits of the doctrine, it is important to 
learn the context in which the doctrine was created.  A look at the 
early authority and literature suggest that the loss of opportunity 
doctrine was created uniquely for medical malpractice.  It is only in 
this context that I suggest that the loss of opportunity be adopted in 
N.H. 
A. Case Law 
 
The seminal case for the loss of opportunity doctrine is Hicks 
v. United States. 8   In that case, the decedent complained to the 
doctor of intense stomach pains and vomiting.9  Both parties agreed 
that the doctor deviated from the accepted procedure of performing a 
                                                        
6 Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 834–35. 
7 Id. at 834. 
8 368 F.2d 626 (4th Cir. 1966). 
9 Id. at 628. 
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rectal examination and inquiring into the existence of diarrhea. 10  
Had the doctor followed the accepted procedure for the complaints, 
the doctor could have identified the problem as an intestinal 
obstruction, not gastroenteritis, and provided medical care 
accordingly.11  The Fourth Circuit found the doctor liable for the 
decedent’s death, despite a pre-existing, life-threatening condition, 
concluding that: “[i]f there was any substantial possibility of survival 
and the defendant has destroyed it, he is answerable.”12   
In its reasoning, the Hicks court analogized the legal 
principal above to a case involving the duty to rescue in which a ship 
captain failed to attempt a rescue mission in search of a missing 
seaman.13  Just as the court found the captain liable for the seaman’s 
death by destroying his opportunity for survival, the Hicks court 
similarly found the doctor liable for destroying the patient’s 
opportunity for survival.14 
While the Hicks court is often credited as the seminal case 
for the loss of chance doctrine, Kallenberg v. Beth Israel Hospital15 
is often recognized as the first case to expressly allow recovery 
under the doctrine.16  In Kallenberg, the doctor prescribed a specific 
medication to reduce the patient’s blood pressure in preparation for 
surgery.17  For an unknown reason, the doctor failed to administer 
the correct medication, and the patient later hemorrhaged three times 
before dying.18  In the wrongful death action arising from medical 
negligence, the plaintiff recovered for the loss of chance of a more 
favorable outcome (i.e., a reduction by twenty to forty percent in the 
plaintiff’s chance of survival).19 
                                                         
10 Id. at 630. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 632. 
13 Id. at 632–33 (citing Gardner v. Nat’l Bulk Carriers, Inc., 310 F.2d 284 (4th Cir. 
1962)). 
14 See id. at 633 (comparing the ability to prove causation through an inaction 
causing the loss of opportunity of survival). 
15 357 N.Y.S.2d 508 (App. Div. 1974). 
16 Margaret T. Mangan, The Loss of Chance Doctrine: A Small Price to Pay for 
Human Life, 42 S.D. L. REV. 279, 287–288 (1997). 
17 357 N.Y.S.2d at 509. 
18 Id.  
19 Id. at 510–11. 
     
2015                                     LOSS OF OPPORTUNITY                                      103 
 




 Despite the existence of the loss of opportunity concept, 
many credit the widespread popularity of the doctrine to Professor 
Joseph King’s 1981 law journal article: Causation, Valuation, and 
Chance in Personal Injury Torts Involving Pre-Existing Conditions 
and Future Consequences.20  In the article, King argued that the loss 
of chance of “achieving a favorable outcome or avoiding an adverse 
consequence” should be a cognizable claim and that courts should 
not accept the limited “all-or-nothing” approach in which recovery is 
restricted to whether the defendant caused or did not cause the loss.21  
King pointed out that under the traditional approach, a plaintiff is 
always denied redress when the chance of recovery from the pre-
existing condition is fifty percent or less (i.e., below the typical 
standard of proof for causation). 22   Therefore, he argued, not 
allowing recovery for loss of chance in said cases contravenes the 
fundamental tort law goal of deterrence—it does not allow recovery 
for negligent behavior causing “statistically demonstrable losses.”23  
However, King qualified that the loss of chance of recovery should 
not be a cognizable claim unless the plaintiff actually suffers a harm 
(e.g., death).24  If the plaintiff suffers a harm, the defendant should 
be liable up to the amount proportional to the lost opportunity.25 
In King’s second article, published more than fifteen years 
later, King recognized the manner in which the courts had 
interpreted the doctrine, and he offered suggestions for improving 
the doctrine. 26  In the article, King enumerated four elements he 
believed were necessary before the loss of chance doctrine should be 
implicated.27  These elements were:                                                         
20 90 YALE L.J. 1353 (1981). 
21 Id. at 1354–63. 
22 Id. at 1372, 1376. 
23 Id. at 1377. 
24 See id. at 1362. 
25 Id. at 1356. 
26 Joseph H. King, Jr., “Reduction of Likelihood” Reformulation and Other 
Retrofitting of the Loss-of-a-Chance Doctrine, 28 U. MEM. L. REV. 491, 560 
(1998) (stating some of the areas of improvement include suggested limits to the 
scope of the doctrine). 
27 Id. at 495. 
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(1) the defendant tortiously failed to satisfy a duty 
owed to the victim to protect or preserve the 
victim’s prospects for some more favorable 
outcome; (2) either (a) the duty owed to the victim 
was based on a special relationship, undertaking, or 
other basis sufficient to support a preexisting duty 
to protect the victim’s likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome, or (b) the only question was 
how to reflect the presence of a preexisting 
condition in calculating the damages for a 
materialized injury that the defendant is proven to 
have probably actively, tortiously caused; (3) the 
defendant’s tortious conduct reduced the likelihood 
that the victim would have otherwise achieved a 
more favorable outcome; and (4) the defendant’s 
tortious conduct was the reason it was not feasible 
to determine precisely whether or not the more 
favorable outcome would have materialized but for 
the tortious conduct.28 
 Both of King’s articles are almost always cited by scholars29 
and courts30 when the loss of opportunity doctrine is at issue.  The 
limitations on extending the doctrine discussed in said articles—and 
the limitations implied through stare decisis in restricting the 
doctrine to medical malpractice—are important restraints on the 
doctrine and should be considered by any state in deciding how to 
apply the doctrine. 
II. PRESENT DAY TREATMENT AMONG THE STATES 
 
 Although a state should not adopt a doctrine simply because 
other states have adopted it, the N.H. Legislature should at least                                                         
28 Id.  
29 See, e.g., Tory A. Weigand, Lost Chances, Felt Necessities, and the Tale of Two 
Cities, 43 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 327, 350–51, 350 n.149 (2010) (citing both articles to 
provide a general overview of the loss of chance doctrine). 
30 See, e.g., Lord, 770 A.2d at 1105–06 (citing both articles to provide a general 
overview of the various approaches to loss of chance claims). 
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consider the significant support for the doctrine in the Northeast.  
The following is a list of all the Northeastern States from the U.S. 
Census Bureau: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, 
Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, Pennsylvania, and New 
Jersey. 31  For the purposes of this article, Delaware will also be 
included in this list since several other sources consider Delaware to 
be in the Northeast and because of its relative similarity in size and 
population to New Hampshire.32  I will focus on these states for the 
remainder of this article.   
A. Adoption v. Non-Adoption 
 
Today, states are relatively evenly split on whether to hold 
doctors liable in situations where the doctor has deprived the patient 
of an opportunity for a better outcome.33  However, the northeastern 
states appear to favor the doctrine—the regional states that have 
adopted the doctrine include Massachusetts, 34  New Jersey, 35 
Delaware,36 New York,37 and Pennsylvania.38  Connecticut claimed 
to adopt the doctrine but retained the traditional requirement of at 
least a fifty-one percent chance of survival prior to the alleged 
                                                        
31 Census Regions and Divisions of the United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/geo/maps-data/maps/pdfs/reference/us_regdiv.pdf (last 
visited Sept. 19, 2014). 
32 See, e.g., Regions of the United States, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/gmdhtml/rrhtml/regdef.html (last visited Sept. 19, 
2014). 
33 See Lord, 770 A.2d at 1105; Alice Férot, The Theory of Loss of Chance: 
Between Reticence and Acceptance, 8 FLA. INT’L U. L. REV. 591, 610–11 (2013) 
(generating a list of states, that includes twenty-one states in favor and twenty 
states plus D.C. against adoption of the doctrine); Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 828 
(characterizing the states that have adopted the doctrine as “a substantial and 
growing majority”); Weigand, supra note 29, at 389–90 (criticizing the 
Matsuyama court for its misleading characterization of the strength of the 
majority). 
34 Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 828–29. 
35 Evers v. Dollinger, 471 A.2d 405, 415 (N.J. 1984). 
36 United States v. Anderson, 669 A.2d 73, 79 (Del. 1995). 
37 Kallenberg, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 510–11. 
38 Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280, 1288 (Pa. 1978). 
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negligence. 39   The only regional state, notwithstanding New 
Hampshire, that has expressly refused to adopt the doctrine is 
Vermont.40  Rhode Island41 and Maine42 have neither adopted nor 
expressly refused to adopt the doctrine. 
While the Supreme Court of Vermont refused to adopt the 
doctrine, it acknowledged that some reasons to adopt it were 
“appealing.” 43  However, the court was concerned with departing 
from its “strict” pre-established law, expanding litigation to new 
plaintiffs, and impacting other areas of Vermont life and law.44  In 
support of refusing to adopt the doctrine, Vermont cited an Alaskan 
case in which the District Court found the loss of chance doctrine 
“particularly ill-suited in small, rural states” where the best medical 
care is not available “at anything approaching a reasonable cost.”45  
New Hampshire’s treatment of the doctrine is discussed in section 
‘V’ below. 
B. The Three Approaches to Loss of Opportunity Claims 
 
While the Northeastern states treat loss of opportunity claims 
similarly, there has been more variation among the rest of the 
country and courts have adopted one of three basic approaches: the 
                                                        
39 Boone v. William W. Backus Hosp., 864 A.2d 1, 18 (Conn. 2005) (“In order for 
the plaintiff to prevail on his claim that the defendant's negligent acts decreased 
the decedent's chance for successful treatment, the plaintiff must show (1) that the 
decedent had in fact been deprived of a chance for successful treatment and (2) 
that the decreased chance for successful treatment more likely than not resulted 
from the defendant's negligence.  Thus, in order to satisfy the elements of a lost 
chance claim, the plaintiff must first prove that prior to the defendant's alleged 
negligence, the decedent had a chance of survival of at least 51 percent.”) 
(emphasis in original) (brackets, internal quotation marks, and citations omitted); 
LaBieniec v. Baker, 526 A.2d 1341, 1345 (Conn. 1987). 
40 Smith v. Parrott, 833 A.2d 843, 848–49 (Vt. 2003). 
41 Malinou v. Miriam Hosp., 24 A.3d 497, 512 (R.I. 2011). 
42 Phillips v. E. Maine Med. Ctr., 565 A.2d 306, 308 (Me. 1989). 
43 Smith, 833 A.2d at 848. 
44 Id. (discussing concern for the adoption of the doctrine because of the impact on 
the cost and practice of medicine and the concern for the doctrine’s expansion to 
other areas of law outside medicine in Vermont like law, architecture, and 
accounting). 
45 Id. (quoting Crosby v. U.S., 48 F. Supp.2d 924, 932 (D. Alaska 1999)). 
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traditional approach, the relaxed standard approach, and the loss of 
chance doctrine approach.46 
1. Traditional Approach 
 
The traditional approach is still used by many courts and 
focuses exclusively on causation.47  This is the approach that the 
N.H. Legislature imposed on the state.48  This approach rejects the 
loss of opportunity doctrine altogether and is referred to as the “all-
or-nothing rule.”49  Under this approach, the plaintiff must prove that 
the defendant’s negligence destroyed the plaintiff’s opportunity for a 
more favorable outcome by fifty-one percent or more. 50   If the 
plaintiff satisfies this burden, the plaintiff recovers for the entirety of 
the damages, regardless of the existence of any pre-existing 
condition.51  However, if the plaintiff cannot show causation by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the plaintiff recovers nothing. 52  
Therefore, a pre-existing condition that renders a patient with a fifty 
percent or less opportunity for survival prior to the negligent act will 
receive no recovery, regardless of the facts of the case and how 
egregious the medical negligence. 53   That is because, “[b]y 
definition, it is more probable than not that the pre-existing condition 
rather than the delayed diagnosis caused the injury.”54 
The all-or-nothing approach has the potential to significantly 
overcompensate or significantly undercompensate the plaintiff. 55  
The defendant overcompensates the plaintiff when the plaintiff 
                                                        
46 King, supra note 26, at 505–509. 
47 Id. at 499, 505. 
48 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:2(III) (2010). 
49 See, e.g., King, supra note 26, at 506 (referring to the approach as “the all-or-
nothing rule”). 
50 Lord, 770 A.2d at 1105. 
51 Id. 
52 Id.; King, supra note 26, at 506. 
53 Lord, 770 A.2d at 1105. 
54 Weigand, supra note 29, at 350. 
55 Mangan, supra note 16, at 302 (“It has also been argued that the all-or-nothing 
approach may either benefit or adversely affect either the plaintiff or the defendant 
depending upon the circumstances.”). 
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succeeds on his or her claim because the plaintiff recovers all 
damages, regardless of any pre-existing injury.56   
However, the defendant undercompensates the plaintiff when 
the chance of survival is less than fifty-one percent prior to the 
doctor’s negligence because the plaintiff then recovers zero damages, 
no matter “how flagrant the negligence.” 57   This leaves those 
plaintiffs who are “often least able to exercise independent 
judgment…at the mercy” of medical professionals who have zero 
liability, when those plaintiffs are “the most in need of protection 
against medical malpractice.”58 
The fact that a plaintiff recovers in full if the expert evidence 
demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff 
had a fifty-one percent chance of survival prior to the negligence, but 
recovers nothing if it determines the plaintiff had just a one percent 
less chance of survival, is worrisome.59  That is because “for every 
expert witness who evaluates the lost chance at 49%, there is another 
that estimates it at closer to 51%.”60  This distinction is arbitrary and 
contrary to the fundamental goals of tort law, as the outcome of the 
case hinges merely on the “search for a willing witness” to testify to 
the precise needed percentage.61   
However, this approach is used in many states perhaps due to 
a reticence to create new law, the perceived notion that it comports 
closely with traditional tort law, and the relative ease with which                                                         
56 See Lord, 770 A.2d at 1105. 
57 See Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 829–30. 
58 Férot, supra note 33, at 619–20 (citing Roberson v. Counselman, 686 P.2d 149, 
160 (Kan. 1984)). 
59 See Lord, 770 A.2d at 1105; Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 830 (describing the loss 
of chance doctrine as more fairly allocating costs and risks of injuries and more 
fairly compensating the patient than the traditional method and therefore 
comporting more closely to “the fundamental aims of tort law”). 
60 Férot, supra note 33, at 619 (quoting Thompson v. Sun City Cmty. Hosp., 688 
P.2d 605, 607 (Ariz. 1984)). 
61 See Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 830 (stating that many courts and commenters 
have noted that the all-or-nothing rule does not advance the fundamental aims of 
tort law, including failure to: “fairly allocate[] the costs and risks of human 
injuries[,] . . . deter medical negligence[,] . . . provide the proper incentives[,] . . . 
[and] fairly compensate[] for the[] loss); Renzi v. Paredes, 890 N.E.2d 806, 812 
(Mass. 2008) (stating the rule has become “inappropriate in light of the 
contemporary realities of medical malpractice”); Férot, supra note 34, at 619. 
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courts can apply the approach. 62   It is important that the N.H. 
Legislature, in choosing this approach, recognizes the existence of 
these issues. 
2. Relaxed Standard Approach 
 
The relaxed standard approach is the least popular of the 
three approaches and again focuses on causation.63  This approach 
has not been considered in N.H.  Under this approach, a plaintiff 
needs to show that the defendant “negligently increased the risk of 
harm or destroyed a substantial possibility of achieving a more 
favorable outcome.” 64  The amount of increased chance of harm 
varies by jurisdiction—some require a “substantial” increase while 
others require an increase to any degree. 65  Under the traditional 
conception of the relaxed standard approach, the trier of fact then 
determines if the plaintiff has shown by a fifty-one percent or more 
likelihood that the defendant’s negligence caused the plaintiff’s 
ultimate injury claimed.66  However, some jurisdictions adopting this 
approach have allowed juries to award damages without the plaintiff 
proving causation by a preponderance of the evidence.67   
Regardless, recovery in all jurisdictions under the relaxed standard 
approach, like the traditional approach, only provides full recovery 
or no recovery at all.68  King describes this approach as “the worst of 
both worlds” because, like the traditional approach, it is subject to 
the arbitrary all-or-nothing rule, but the approach further diverges 
from just compensation by allowing the plaintiff the opportunity to 
bypass a judge and convince a jury to award full compensation, 
despite the existence of a pre-existing injury.69  Courts adopting this 
                                                        
62 See King, supra note 26, at 506. 
63 See id. at 506–07 (“A few courts have adopted relaxed proof variations of the 
traditional rule, while usually retaining its basic all-or-nothing features.”). 
64 Id. at 507. 
65 Lord, 770 A.2d at 1105. 
66 King, supra note 26, at 507–08.  
67 Id. at 507 n.55.  
68 See id. at 508 (stating the relaxed approach is subject to the all-or-nothing rule). 
69 Id. 
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approach often cite to the Restatement (Second) of Torts for 
authority.70 
3. Loss of Opportunity Doctrine Approach 
 
Many courts have adopted the loss of opportunity doctrine 
for medical malpractice cases.71  It is under this approach that the 
N.H. Supreme Court adopted the doctrine in 2001. 72   Here, the 
injury is not the ultimate injury suffered (e.g., death), as is the case 
with the above approaches.73  Rather, under the loss of opportunity 
doctrine, the injury is the loss of opportunity for a more favorable 
outcome deprived by the defendant. 74   Under this approach, the 
plaintiff may recover if he or she can show that the defendant’s 
negligence caused the loss of opportunity by a preponderance of the 
evidence.75  However, some courts limit recovery only to when the 
defendant has deprived the plaintiff of an opportunity to a 
“substantial” degree.76   
Because the injury is the loss of opportunity, the plaintiff’s 
recovery is limited only to the “damages actually attributable to the 
defendant’s negligence.”77  For example, if a defendant deprives a 
plaintiff of a thirty percent chance of survival by misdiagnosing the 
plaintiff, the plaintiff’s estate could recover up to thirty percent of                                                         
70 Tory A. Weigand, Loss of Chance in Medical Malpractice: The Need for 
Caution, 87 MASS. L. REV. 3, 8 (2002); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 
323 (1965) (“One who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to render 
services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of 
the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm 
resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if 
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm 
is suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.”) (emphasis 
added). 
71 King, supra note 26, at 508. 
72 Lord, 770 A.2d at 1106 (adopting the loss of opportunity doctrine).  However, as 
discussed later, the N.H. Legislature abrogated the adoption.  See N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 507-E:2(III) (2010). 
73 Lord, 770 A.2d at 1105–06. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 1106. 
76 King, supra note 26, at 509. 
77 Lord, 770 A.2d at 1106. 
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the value of the plaintiff’s life.78  This has been described as the 
proportional damages approach for the doctrine.79  By framing the 
injury as the loss of opportunity, and by requiring the plaintiff to 
show that the defendant caused the injury by a preponderance of 
evidence, the doctrine appears to comport with the traditional tort 
law principles of causation, while also tailoring the value of the 
damages more closely to the actual harm.80  For these reasons, it is 
no surprise that the N.H. Supreme Court was drawn to the doctrine. 
III. UNDERSTANDING THE LOSS OF OPPORTUNITY DOCTRINE 
 
 To fully understand this third approach to a loss of 
opportunity claim adopted initially adopted by N.H., it is important 
to understand its elements.  To recover under a typical loss of 
opportunity claim, a plaintiff must prove the traditional elements of 
negligence: (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care; (2) 
the defendant breached his or her duty; (3) the plaintiff suffered an 
injury; (4) the defendant’s breach caused the plaintiff’s injury by a 
preponderance of the evidence; and (5) the plaintiff must have 
suffered damages. 81   Each element must be proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence.82 
A. Duty and Breach 
 
 In a typical loss of opportunity claim, the medical 
professional owes a duty of care to the patient.83  A medical care 
provider has breached the duty of care when failing to act in 
accordance with the reasonable professional practice accepted in its 
                                                        
78 See King, supra note 26, at 509 (describing a similar illustration). 
79 See Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 839 (describing the valuation process for a loss 
of chance claim under the proportional damages method). 
80 See Lord, 770 A.2d at 1106 (citing Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr. 805 P.2d 589, 
592 (Nev. 1991)); Férot, supra note 33, at 594–95. 
81 Férot, supra note 33, at 595. 
82 Id. at 603. 
83 See id. at 598 (discussing the breach of the duty of care owed to the patient in a 
medical setting). 
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position. 84   Common breaches of the duty of care in medical 
malpractice cases include: misdiagnosis, 85  delay in diagnosis or 
treatment,86 negligent decisions,87 and negligent execution.88 
 Further, the loss of opportunity doctrine is compatible with, 
and applied to cases involving, joint liability; the doctrine applies to 
multiple defendants that have breached the duty of care owed to the 
plaintiff.89  For example, in Renzi, the Massachusetts Supreme Court  
found the radiologist and internal medicine physician jointly and 
severally liable for the plaintiff’s loss of chance of survival when 
both physicians negligently failed to provide the other with patient 
information that would have led to an earlier diagnosis of breast 
cancer. 90   The doctrine is also compatible with cases involving 
comparative negligence.91 
 B. Injury 
 
                                                        
84 Francoeur v. Piper, 776 A.2d 1270, 1273 (N.H. 2001) (citing N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 507-E:2 (1997)); accord Palandjian v. Foster, 842 N.E.2d 916, 920 (Mass. 
2006) (stating the proper standard for a general practitioner physician is whether it 
has “exercised the degree of care and skill of the average qualified practitioner,” 
while the standard for a specialist physician is if it has acted in accordance with 
the “care and skill of the average member of the profession” practicing the 
specialty, considering advances in the field). 
85 E.g., Lord, 770 A.2d at 1104 (claiming a breach of care because the defendant 
negligently misdiagnosed the spinal cord injury resulting in exacerbating medical 
care). 
86 E.g., Bronson v. Hitchcock Clinic, 677 A.2d 665, 668 (N.H. 1996) (claiming a 
breach of care because the defendant negligently failed to diagnosis and treat the 
plaintiff with Hodgkins Disease for six months prior to inspection). 
87 E.g., Morrill v. Tilney, 519 A.2d 293, 293–94 (N.H. 1986) (claiming a breach of 
care because the defendant negligently decided to perform cosmetic surgery rather 
than amputate the plaintiff’s finger). 
88 E.g., Anglin v. Kleeman, 665 A.2d 747, 749 (N.H. 1995) (claiming a breach of 
care because the defendant negligently left a lap sponge in the plaintiff’s knee 
from reconstructive knee surgery). 
89 Férot, supra note 33, at 598. 
90 890 N.E.2d at 819. 
91 E.g., Scafidi v. Seiler, 574 A.2d 398, 408 (N.J. 1990) (“Our holding [awarding 
recovery for loss of chance] is also consistent with the principles underlying the 
comparative-negligence statute. . . . .”). 
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 Under the loss of opportunity doctrine, the loss of 
opportunity for a more favorable outcome is, itself, the injury.92  The 
injury is not the actual, unfavorable outcome.93  However, in order to 
recover under the doctrine, both the loss of opportunity and the 
unfavorable outcome are necessary.94  For example, in Renzi, had 
the doctors successfully treated the breast cancer detected at a later 
stage due to negligence, the plaintiff would not have a loss of chance 
claim—that is, because despite the fact that the doctors’ negligence 
caused the plaintiff to have a reduced likelihood of survival, the 
plaintiff did not suffer an unfavorable outcome.95  The unfavorable 
outcome may include: “the death of the patient, aggravated 
symptoms, or a lack of improvement of the condition of the 
patient.”96  
  But, to recover under the doctrine, the plaintiff must have 
some chance of survival prior to the negligence.97  The doctrine also 
does not apply when the plaintiff has a one hundred percent chance 
of survival prior to the negligence and the defendant has destroyed 
the entire percentage.98  This is because recovering for a reduced one 
hundred percent chance of survival would be no different from the 
traditional tort claim of wrongful death. 
 Although the statistics from which courts determine the loss 
of opportunity are procured and accepted by the medical community 
and are increasingly reliable, “they cannot define with absolute 
certainty what would have been the outcome of the patient’s 
condition in the absence of the tortious act.” 99  Rather, they are 
merely careful estimates.100  In determining the amount of loss of 
opportunity, courts must speculate about the “inevitable evolution of 
the medical condition” and the likely outcome had the physician 
provided appropriate care.101  Because the determination does not                                                         
92 Lord, 770 A.2d at 1105. 
93 Férot, supra note 33, at 595. 
94 Id. at 596–97. 
95 See generally Renzi, 890 N.E.2d at 809. 
96 Férot, supra note 33, at 597. 
97 Id. at 596. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 601–02. 
100 See Id. 
101 Id. at 600. 
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account for a scenario when the medical condition takes an unusual 
path, the court may require the defendant to overcompensate or 
undercompensate the plaintiff, depending on how the plaintiff’s 
medical condition would have progressed.102  However, some argue 
that this uncertainty is acceptable since the tortfeasor created the 
uncertainty, and thus the tortfeasor should “bear the burden of 
possibly overcompensating the patient.”103  In eliciting this argument, 
many courts quote King’s article.104   
C. Causation 
 
 Because the doctrine frames the injury as the loss of 
opportunity, causation appears to be consistent with the traditional 
principles of tort law.105  Nonetheless, some critics of the doctrine 
view the causation element to be inconsistent with traditional tort 
law because the causation element focuses on whether the negligent 
behavior caused the loss of opportunity, not whether it caused the 
ultimate injury.106 
Therefore, to recover under the loss of opportunity doctrine, 
the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance that the tortfeasor’s 
negligence caused the plaintiff’s injury, with the plaintiff’s injury 
being the diminished likelihood of a more favorable outcome.107                                                         
102 Id. at 600–02. 
103 Id. at 602; see Lord, 770 A.2d at 1108 (“[W]e fail to see the logic in denying an 
injured plaintiff recovery against a physician for the lost opportunity of a better 
outcome on the basis that the alleged injury is too difficult to calculate, when the 
physician’s own conduct has caused the difficulty.”). 
104 See, e.g., DeBurkarte v. Louvar, 393 N.W.2d 131, 137 (Iowa 1986) (quoting 
King, supra note 21, at 1378) (“[B]ut for the defendant’s tortious conduct, it 
would not have been necessary to grapple with the imponderables of chance.”) 
(brackets omitted). 
105 Férot, supra note 34, at 595; see e.g., Lord, 770 A.2d at 1107 (“By recognizing 
loss of opportunity as a cognizable injury, we refute the notion that the plaintiff 
would be unable to prove that the defendants' negligence probably caused her to 
suffer injuries which would not otherwise have occurred. The right we recognize 
today still requires a plaintiff to prove that the injury she suffered-the lost 
opportunity for a better outcome-was caused, more probably than not, by the 
defendant's negligence.”)(citations omitted). 
106 See, e.g., Smith, 833 A.2d at 381 (describing the doctrine as a “significant 
departure” from the traditional tort law of causation). 
107 Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 832. 
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 Determining what metric to use to calculate the loss of 
opportunity should vary depending on the nature of the case and the 
availability of the medical evidence.108  For example, in Renzi, the 
court used a ten-year survival metric to calculate damages for the 
loss of chance of survival for a deceased patient who had suffered 
from breast cancer.109  However, in Matsuyama, the court used a 
five-year survival metric for a defendant suffering from gastric 
cancer.110 
 Once the metric is chosen, the court must determine how 
much the defendant owes the plaintiff for the lost chance.111  As 
previously discussed, the proportional damages approach is the most 
common method of valuation for the loss of chance doctrine. 112  
Under this method, recovery is limited to loss of chance deprived by 
the defendant. 113   Courts calculate the amount of damages the 
defendant owes the plaintiff by completing the following procedure:  
 
(1) The fact finder must first calculate the total 
amount of damages allowable for the death under 
the wrongful death statute…or, in the case of 
medical malpractice not resulting in death, the full 
amount of damages allowable for the injury.  This is 
the amount to which the decedent would be entitled 
if the case were not a loss of chance case: the full 
amount of compensation for the decedent's death or 
injury. 
(2) The fact finder must next calculate the patient’s 
chance of survival or cure immediately preceding 
(“but for”) the medical malpractice. 
(3) The fact finder must then calculate the chance of 
survival or cure that the patient had as a result of the 
medical malpractice.                                                         
108 Id. at 838. 
109 890 N.E.2d at 811. 
110 890 N.E.2d at 838. 
111 Id. at 839. 
112 Id. 
113 Id. 
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(4) The fact finder must then subtract the amount 
derived in step 3 from the amount derived in step 2. 
(5) The fact finder must then multiply the amount 
determined in step 1 by the percentage calculated in 
step 4 to derive the proportional damages award for 
loss of chance.114 
 
 For example, assume in a wrongful death action the court 
considered factors—such as the age, health, and earning potential of 
the decedent—and valuated the total amount of damages to be 
$100,000. 115  Further assume that due to the defendant’s negligence, 
the decedent’s chance of survival reduced from fifty percent to ten 
percent, a forty percent reduction.  Because $100,000 times forty 
percent is $40,000, the total recovery to the plaintiff would be 
$40,000. 
Many courts embracing the loss of opportunity doctrine 
recognize that this method does not capture the precise cost to the 
defendant and the precise compensation to the plaintiff for the exact 
loss of opportunity because the figures are based on estimates.116  
However, many courts view this as the best method out of the menu 
of options—the Supreme Court of Massachusetts described this 
method as “the most appropriate way to quantify the value of the 
loss of chance…because it is an easily applied calculation that fairly 
ensures that a defendant is not assessed damages for harm he did not 
cause.” 117   The court further advocated for the method while 
recognizing its imprecision by discussing the long-standing 
acceptance of statistical estimates in tort law, stating that 
“probabilistic evidence, in the form of actuarial tables, assumptions 
about present value and future interest rates, statistical measures of 
future harm, and the like, is the stock-in-trade of tort valuation.”118  
However, some critics have cynically described the calculation of 
                                                        
114 Id. at 840 (emphasis in original).  
115 See Scafidi, 574 A.2d at 407 (discussing the factors involved in the method for 
calculating damages for loss of chance of survival). 
116 E.g., Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 840. 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 841. 
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damages under the doctrine as “little more than an elaborate, 
arbitrary guessing game.”119 
IV. THE LOSS OF OPPORTUNITY DOCTRINE IN NEW HAMPSHIRE 
 
 With a basic understanding of the doctrine, this article will 
now discuss the changing treatment of the doctrine in New 
Hampshire and explore the various reasons why the doctrine was 
accepted and then rejected in the state.  In exploring these reasons, 
this article will consider the merits of the arguments given. 
A. Tort Reform Legislation followed by Common Law Adoption 
 
 Interestingly, there has been some disagreement in New 
Hampshire between the branches of government with respect to 
whether or not the loss of opportunity doctrine should be adopted.120  
First, in 1986, the state’s legislature enacted comprehensive tort 
reform in an attempt to promote the availability and affordability of 
liability insurance for New Hampshire citizens.121  The legislature 
believed that tort liability was expanding, which would create a 
higher risk for insurers and therefore higher insurance premiums and 
rates for New Hampshire natives.122  In the statutory scheme, the 
legislature defined “medical injury” as:  
 
[A]ny adverse, untoward or undesired consequences 
arising out of or sustained in the course of 
professional services rendered by a medical care 
provider, whether resulting from negligence, error, 
or omission in the performance of such services; . . . 
from failure to diagnose; . . . or otherwise arising 
out of or sustained in the course of such services.123 
                                                         
119 Paul M. Secunda, A Public Interest Model for Applying Lost Chance Theory to 
Probabilistic Injuries in Employment Discrimination Cases, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 
747, 760 (2005). 
120 Weigand, supra note 29, at 357. 
121 Lord, 770 A.2d at 1109 (Broderick, J., concurring) (citing N.H.S. J. 190 (1986)). 
122 Id. 
123 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:1(III) (2010). 
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 Interpreting the legislature’s definition of medical injury, in 
2001, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire expressly adopted the 
loss of opportunity doctrine in Lord v. Lovett.124  In the case, the 
plaintiff sued the defendants for negligently misdiagnosing her 
spinal cord injury resulting from an automobile accident. 125  The 
plaintiff argued that the misdiagnosis caused the defendants to fail to 
properly immobilize her and administer steroid therapy, thereby 
depriving her of a substantially better outcome of recovery as she 
continued to suffer from paralysis, weakness, and sensitivity.126   
In recognizing the loss of opportunity doctrine, the court 
found the injury of a loss of opportunity for a favorable outcome to 
be consistent with the legislature’s definition of medical injury.127  
Therefore, the court only considered the plain meaning of the statute, 
and not its legislative history in determining that the loss of chance 
was a cognizable “injury” in NH.128  However, the court suggested 
that even looking at the legislative history, the loss of an opportunity 
would satisfy the definition found in the statute because the history 
suggested that the definition included “all conceivable lawsuits 
against medical care providers.”129  With the injury established as 
the loss of opportunity, the court found that the plaintiff could prove 
by a preponderance of evidence that the defendant’s negligence 
caused the medical injury.130                                                         
124 770 A.2d at 1106. 
125 Id. at 1104. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. at 1106-07 (“We recognize the right based not upon an "expansive" reading 
of the statute or a "generous" interpretation of medical injury, but rather, upon a 
strict application of statutory construction and well-established tort principles to a 
claim which we confront directly for the first time.  We do not drag it from the 
shadows of the common law but draw it from the light of the legislative 
enactment.”) (quotations in original). 
128 Id. at 1107 (stating that when the statute’s language is clear, consideration of 
the meaning does not extend beyond the plain language of the statute).  
129 Id. 
130 Lord, 770 A.2d at 1107 (“The right we recognize today still requires a plaintiff 
to prove that the injury she suffered -- the lost opportunity for a better outcome -- 
was caused, more probably than not, by the defendant's negligence.”); see N.H. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:2 (2013) (“In any action for medical injury, the plaintiff 
shall have the burden of proving by affirmative evidence which must include 
expert testimony of a competent witness or witnesses:… (c) That as a proximate 
result thereof, the injured person suffered injuries which would not otherwise have 
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In Justice Broderick’s concurring opinion, he acknowledged 
that the legislation was “broad enough to encompass the loss of 
chance doctrine.”131  However, he agreed with the majority “with 
reservation” because the doctrine’s adoption “ironically springs from 
a statute passed in 1986 as part of comprehensive tort reform, which 
was intended to preempt common law and bring predictability and 
stability to the insurance market, in part, for the benefit of health 
care providers.”132  The justice spent the majority of his concurrence 
explaining the history of the legislation and how its clear intent was 
to keep tort liability and thus, insurance costs, down.133  However, in 
his conclusion, Justice Broderick stated that it was unclear from the 
legislative history whether the legislature intended merely to codify 
the then-existing common law causes of action for medical 
malpractice or rather for it to truly encompass all medical 
malpractice cases.134  Therefore, Justice Broderick concurred, but he 
invited the legislature to take further action if it disagreed with the 
court’s interpretation.135 
B. The Legislature Abrogates the Supreme Court 
 
 Soon thereafter, in 2003, the legislature heeded the words of 
Justice Broderick and expressed its disagreement with the Supreme 
Court of New Hampshire’s interpretation of its statute by enacting 
the following amendment:136 
 
The requirements of this section are not satisfied by 
evidence of loss of opportunity for a substantially 
better outcome.  However, this paragraph shall not 
bar claims based on evidence that negligent conduct 
by the defendant medical provider or providers 
proximately caused the ultimate harm, regardless of 
                                                                                                                               
occurred.”). 
131 Lord, 770 A.2d at 1109 (Broderick, J., concurring). 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 1109–10. 
134 Id. at 1110. 
135 Id. 
136 See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:2(III) (2010). 
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the chance of survival or recovery from an 
underlying condition.137 
 Justice Broderick’s suspicion that the legislature did not 
intend for recovery of the loss of opportunity—in light of the overall 
tort reform aimed at lowering tort liability and insurance costs—
proved to be warranted given the legislature’s express statement of 
purpose for the amendment: 
  
Availability and affordability of insurance against 
liability for medical injury is essential for the 
protection of patients as well as assuring availability 
of and access to essential medical and hospital care.  
This act reaffirms the intent of the general court 
legislature to contain the costs of the medical injury 
reparations system and to promote availability and 
affordability of insurance against liability for 
medical injury by codifying the law applicable to 
recovery of damages for medical injury in RSA 
507-E. The decision by the Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire…departed from that intent by 
broadening the opportunity to recover damages in 
medical injury cases through recognition of the so-
called “loss of opportunity” doctrine.  This act is 
intended to overrule that decision as well as to 
restate the legislative policy that this judicial 
broadening of the opportunity to recover damages 
in medical injury cases is contrary to the intent of 
the general court in enacting RSA 507:E.138 
Because rejection of the doctrine appeared to be motivated 
by the notion that the doctrine would raise medical costs and 
therefore limit medical care to NH citizens, this rationale, if true, is 
quite persuasive in claiming that adoption of the doctrine could harm 
                                                        
137 Id. 
138 Weigand, supra note 29, at 359 (quoting N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:2(III) 
(2010); S.B. 119, 158th Leg., 1st Sess. (N.H. 2009)) (brackets omitted). 
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N.H. citizens.139  Thus, to determine if the increased insurance cost 
argument is a sound reason to abrogate the law of the New 
Hampshire Supreme Court, it logically follows that one should 
consider and analyze the changes in insurance premiums between 
various states that have and have not adopted the doctrine. 
V. THE LOSS OF OPPORTUNITY DOCTRINE AND ITS EFFECTS ON 
LITIGATION AND INSURANCE COSTS 
 
 While the New Hampshire legislature and others have argued 
that the loss of opportunity doctrine increases both tort litigation and 
insurance costs for medical care, the evidence suggests otherwise.  
Statistics in the Northeastern states demonstrate that the loss of 
opportunity doctrine neither increases tort litigation nor increases 
insurance premiums.  Thus, critics’ fears about the doctrine appear to 
be unfounded. 
A. Statistics in the Northeast 
  
Conducting an analysis of the effects of the loss of 
opportunity doctrine on medical malpractice within each state 
requires observation of: (1) the change in the number of medical 
malpractice lawsuits filed before and after adoption of the doctrine; 
and (2) the change in insurance premium rates for medical 
malpractice insurance before and after adoption of the doctrine.140  
Conducting a present-day analysis of the effect of the adoption of the 
loss of opportunity doctrine in Northeastern states appears to 
alleviate the financial concern over the consequences of adopting the 
doctrine, perhaps thereby allowing other policy concerns to drive the 
consideration of whether or not to adopt the loss of opportunity 
doctrine. 
                                                        
139 See, e.g., Mangan, supra note 16, at 287 (advocating for adoption of the loss of 
chance doctrine, inter alia, because the value of human life should take 
precedence over any burdens on the medical profession). 
140 Steven R. Koch, Comment, Whose Loss is it Anyway? Effects of the “Lost-
Chance” Doctrine on Civil Litigation and Medical Malpractice Insurance, 88 
N.C.L. REV. 595, 619 (2010). 
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According to statistics of Northeastern states since the 1990s, 
there does not appear to be a connection between adoption of the 
doctrine and increases in litigation. 
The following statistics are taken from the National 
Practitioner Data Bank (“NPDB”).  Congress created NPDB 
primarily to improve health care quality, protect the public, and 
reduce health care fraud and abuse.141  In 2013, NPDB merged with 
Healthcare Integrity and Protection Data Bank (“HIPDA”), pursuant 
to the Affordable Care Act, to create a comprehensive review of 
health care information.142  The resulting data bank retained NPDB’s 
name.143  Organizations that must report to NPDB include, medical 
malpractice payers (e.g., hospitals), state licensing and certification 
authorities, various state agencies, and various health care entities.144  
Noncompliance can result in civil penalties.145  The Bank is widely 
relied upon and cited by academics and professionals, including 
those discussing the effects of the loss of chance doctrine on 
malpractice claims and insurance rates.146  As of the writing of this 
article, NPDB data is current up to 2012.147 
The analysis is based on the number of malpractice payments 
reported, rather than the number of malpractice claims actually paid, 
so as to yield the most comprehensive and useful data readily 
                                                        
141 THE NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, http://www.npdb-hipdb.hrsa.gov 




145 Katherine Baicker & Amitabh Chandra, The Effect of Malpractice Liability on 
the Delivery of Health Care, in 8 F. FOR HEALTH ECON. & POL’Y 1, 8 (2006). 
146 See, e.g., Koch, supra note 140, at 620–26 (finding that the loss of chance 
doctrine has “no apparent effect on the number of claims being paid” and that 
“litigation-related costs play a relatively small role” in increasing medical 
malpractice insurance rates); Baicker, supra note 146, at 8–9.  While the National 
Practitioner Data Bank is widely relied upon, observing the Bank overtime has 
revealed that it occasionally makes slight, retroactive changes to the numbers 
based on new information it receives. 
147 THE NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, http://www.npdb-
hipdb.hrsa.gov/resources/npdbstats/npdbStatistics.jsp (last visited Jan. 18, 2014). 
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available to answer the present inquiry.148  In gathering the data, the 
medical professionals were limited to physicians (i.e., those earning 
their Doctor of Medicine (M.D.) or Doctor of Osteopathic Medicine 
(D.O.) degrees).  
 
 
i. Adoption in the Twenty-First Century  
 
Massachusetts is the only Northeastern state—outside New 
Hampshire’s short adoption—that adopted the loss of chance 
doctrine in the twenty-first century, in 2008.149  NPDB reported the 
following medical malpractice payments in Massachusetts: in 2006 
there were 258 payments; in 2007 there were 294 payments; in 2008 
there were 253 payments; in 2009 there were 260 payments; in 2010 
there were 232 payments; in 2011 there were 224 payments; and in 
2012 there were 202 payments.150  For easier reference, see the chart 
below. 
 
                                                        
148 See Koch, supra note 140, at 620 (using the number of malpractice claims paid 
by malpractice insurers as an indicator of the number of actual medical 
malpractice payments made in a particular state because it is the best data set 
available).   
149 Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 828–29. 
150 THE NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, http://www.npdb-
hipdb.hrsa.gov/resources/npdbstats/npdbStatistics.jsp (last visited Nov. 17, 2014). 
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While the number of payments increased by seven in the year 
directly following the adoption of the doctrine in 2008, payments 
increased prior to adoption of the doctrine as well.151  Interestingly, 
the largest increase in the number of payments between 2006 and 
2012 was from 2006 to 2007, the year before the doctrine’s 
adoption.152  Even more interesting, payments generally tended to 
decrease following adoption of the doctrine, the latest reported year 
in 2012 being the lowest of all of the years, 51 less claims paid than 
in the year of adoption.153   
Other states also experienced a general decline in the above 
years, especially in 2012.154  For example, every Northeastern state 
except Maine and New York experienced a decline in the number of 
medical malpractice claim payments in 2012: Connecticut declined 
from 123 to 84, New Hampshire declined from 44 to 37, Vermont 
declined from 16 to 8, Rhode Island declined from 48 to 34, New 
Jersey declined from 426 to 420, Delaware declined from 21 to 20, 




154 See id. 
155 THE NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, http://www.npdb-
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Maine and New York did not decline in 2012, both of their 
malpractice claim payments declined in 2011.156  
Looking specifically at New Hampshire, although the present 
National Data Bank does not offer data prior to 2002, and the 
doctrine was adopted briefly in 2001, other data does not support a 
rise in litigation following adoption of the doctrine; to wit, older 
NPDB data shows a general decline in malpractice litigation from 
2000 to 2004, notwithstanding one 12-payment increase from 2002 
to 2003. 157  Given these findings, there does not appear to be a 
connection between adoption of the doctrine and rising litigation.  A 
chart is offered below for comparison.   
 
                                                         
156 Id. 
157 See id.; THE NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, 
http://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/resources/reports/2004NPDBAnnualReport.pdf 67 
(2004).  I intentionally did not go into detail with respect to the N.H. report 
payments.  The most useful and accurate information is collected from the present 
NPDB, post merger with HIPDB.  See THE NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, 
http://www.npdb.hrsa.gov/resources/npdbMerge.jsp.  NPDB’s present website was 
adjusted as far back as 2002, and older reports are not compatible with the present 
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 Therefore, considering the data surrounding the adoption of 
the doctrine in Massachusetts and New Hampshire in the twenty-first 
century, there does not appear to be a connection between adoption 
of the doctrine and increased medical malpractice litigation. 
 
ii. Adoption in the 1990s  
 
 Delaware was the only northeastern state to adopt the loss of 
chance doctrine in the 1990s, specifically in 1995. 158   NPDB 
reported the following medical malpractice payments: in 1995 there 
were 41 reports; in 1996 there were 39 reports; in 1997 there were 
27 reports; in 1998 there were 30 reports; in 1999 there were 24 
reports; in 2000 there were 31 reports; and in 2001 there were 52 





                                                        
158 Anderson, 669 A.2d at 79. 
159 THE NATIONAL PRACTITIONER DATA BANK, http://www.npdb-
hipdb.hrsa.gov/resources/reports/2001NPDBAnnualReport.pdf (last visited Nov. 
17, 2014).  As explained in supra note 158, data prior to 2002 is less reliable.  And 
of the available data, 1995 was the earliest year for which readily available and 
reliable information could be located.  
020
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 While the number of payments tended to decrease each year, 
the number of payments began increasing in 2000.160  Although one 
could read the above statistics to suggest that the state did not begin 
to experience the effects of adoption of the doctrine until roughly 
five years later, similar patterns of increasing numbers beginning in 
2000 from other states—which did not adopt the doctrine in that 
year—suggests that the spike was due to other causes. 161   For 
example, after decreasing in the number of reported payments from 
1998 to 1999, New Jersey’s payments spiked from 480 to 617 in 
2000, and then again from 617 to 950 in 2001.162  States further 
away like Arizona experienced the same decline and then increase 
beginning in 2000.163  Like above, it appears that other factors, not 
adoption of the doctrine, are driving the number of malpractice suits. 
Therefore, considering the data surrounding the adoption of 
the doctrine in Delaware in the 1990s, there does not appear to be a 
connection between adoption of the doctrine and increased medical 
malpractice litigation. 
 
iii. A Broader Look  
 
 Other Northeastern states have adopted the doctrine, but have 
done so at a time before comprehensive and accurate statistics were 
available to conduct the above analysis.  However, Koch, in his law 
review article—also using statistics from NPDB—looked at other 
states in the country, like Ohio and Illinois, to determine that “no 
apparent effect” existed between adoption of the doctrine and the 
number of claims paid, and that other significant factors must be 
responsible for the significant variations over time.164 
2.  Insurance Premiums 
 
                                                        
160 Id. 
161 See id. 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 See, e.g., Koch, supra note 140, at 622–24 (describing the economic effect of 
adoption of the doctrine as “nothing more than a proverbial drop in the bucket”). 
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According to statistics of Northeastern states since the 1990s, 
there does not appear to be a connection between adoption of the 
doctrine and increases in insurance premiums.   
The following statistics are taken from the National 
Association of Insurance Commissioners (“NAIC”).  NAIC was 
created by the chief insurance regulators from each state165  NAIC 
was created to assist state insurance regulators, protect the public 
interest, and to promote competitive markets. 166   Other legal 
literature has relied on data from NAIC in determining if adoption of 
the loss of chance doctrine causes spikes in insurance premiums.167   
 
i. Adoption in the Twenty-First Century  
 
As previously discussed, Massachusetts adopted the loss of 
chance doctrine in 2008 and was the only northeastern state to adopt 
the doctrine in the twenty-first century, notwithstanding New 
Hampshire’s brief adoption. 168   The following total premiums 
written by medical malpractice insurance providers in Massachusetts 
include: in 2006, $296,397,155; in 2007, $301,542,756; in 2008, 
$311,579,290; in 2009, $322,553,703; in 2010, $314,627,751; in 
2011, $314,106,416; and in 2012, $307,565,195. 169   For easier 
reference, see the chart below. 
 
                                                        
165 THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, 
http://www.naic.org/index_about.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2014). 
166 Id. 
167 See, e.g., Koch, supra note 140, at 625. 
168 Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 828–29. 
169 NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS,, Countrywide Summary of Medical Malpractice 
Insurance, Calendar Years 2003-2012 (Nov. 17, 2014), available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/research_stats_medical_malpractice.pdf.  
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While the written insurance premiums increased in the year 
directly following the adoption of the loss of chance doctrine, the 
preceding years leading to the adoption suggest it was simply 
following the steady increase, with each subsequent year increasing 
by roughly the same proportion.170  However, in the second year 
after adoption of the doctrine, written insurance premiums began to 
consistently decline.171   
While other Northeastern states also experienced a decline in 
the written medical malpractice insurance premiums beginning in 
2010, several northeastern states did not decline in all three 
consecutive years, like in Massachusetts.172  For example, in New 
Hampshire, although insurance premiums declined until 2011, total 
premiums increased in 2012 from $38,065,299 to $39,145,975.173  
Further, in Rhode Island, total premiums increased in 2010 from 
$45,764,559 to $47,082,730, declined in 2011 to $38,559,054, and                                                         
170 Id. 
171 Id. 
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then increased again in 2012 to $42,721,218. 174   New York and 
Vermont also did not have declining written insurance premiums for 
three consecutive years like in Massachusetts.175 
Therefore, because Massachusetts had declining premiums 
from 2010 through 2012, while other northeastern states did not 
consistently decline, it appears that no observable causation can be 
drawn between adoption of the doctrine and increased medical 
malpractice insurance premiums.   
Insurance premium rates in New Hampshire’s brief adoption 
of the doctrine between 2001 and 2003 corroborate this finding.176  
While New Hampshire experienced some increase between these 
years, the increase did not suggest it was caused by adoption of the 
doctrine when compared to other states. 177   See below for 
comparison to New England states. 
 
                                                        
174 NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS,, Countrywide Summary of Medical Malpractice 
Insurance, Calendar Years 2003-2012 (Nov. 17, 2014), available at 
http://www.naic.org/documents/research_stats_medical_malpractice.pdf.  
175 Id. 
176 See id. 
177 See id. 
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Therefore, considering the data surrounding the adoption of 
the doctrine in Massachusetts and New Hampshire in the twenty-first 
century, there does not appear to be a connection between adoption 
of the doctrine and increased insurance premiums. 
 
ii. Adoption in the 1990s  
  
 As previously discussed, Delaware adopted the loss of 
chance doctrine in 1995 and was the only state to adopt the doctrine 
in the 1990s.178  The following total premiums written by medical 
malpractice insurance providers in the state include: in 1993, 
$21,119,146; in 1994, $19,892,132; in 1995, $22,371,992; in 1996, 
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$17,376,588; in 1997, $18,685,921; in 1998, $13,654,123; and in 




The premiums in Delaware appeared to decrease in the year 
immediately following adoption of the loss of opportunity 
doctrine. 180   Although, in the years preceding and following the 
adoption of the doctrine, premiums both rose and fell.181  However, 
overall, in the four years following the adoption, total premiums 
decreased by roughly $8,000,000.182  While some other Northeastern 
states experienced declines during this time period, only New York 
and Massachusetts, states with significantly higher populations, 
experienced greater declines. 183   Further, Connecticut’s medical 
malpractice premiums increased by approximately $18,000,000.184                                                          
179 NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS,, Countrywide Summary of Medical Malpractice 






184 NAT'L ASS'N OF INS. COMM'RS, Countrywide Summary of Medical Malpractice 
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Similarly, Rhode Island’s increased by about $6,400,000185.  While 
Delaware’s insurance premiums began to steadily increase in 2000, 
this trend was consistent with all of the northeastern states.186  This 
trend suggests that some other factors dictate the significant 
fluctuations in premiums; one law review article described the 
adoption of the doctrine’s effect on insurance premiums as merely a 
“proverbial drop in the bucket.”187 
Therefore, considering the data surrounding the adoption of 
the doctrine in Delaware in the 1990s, there does not appear to be a 
connection between adoption of the doctrine and increased insurance 
premiums. 
 
iii. A Broader Look  
 
Other Northeastern states have adopted the doctrine, but have 
done so at a time before comprehensive and accurate statistics were 
available to conduct the above analysis.  However, Koch in his law 
review article—also using statistics from NAIC—compared 
increases in premiums from Delaware and Louisiana, two states that 
adopted the doctrine, with those of Nebraska and Tennessee, two 
states that did not adopt the doctrine.  He concluded that “factors 
other than a state’s adoption or rejection of the lost-chance doctrine 





Studies are consistent with the results of this note that the 
adoption of the loss of opportunity doctrine does not significantly 
impact the number of claims filed.  A common misconception exists 
that courts are now inundated with “frivolous” medical malpractice 
                                                        
185 Id. 
186 See id. 
187 Koch, supra note 140, at 624. 
188 Id. at 625–26. 
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and tort claims in general.189  This misconception by some that too 
many are filing medical malpractice cases has been mostly 
disseminated and perpetuated by those with an independent interest 
in the outcome.190  These individuals and groups have often used 
unreliable information in support of reforming medical malpractice 
and tort law,191 rather than using empirically valid data, which does 
not appear to mirror their arguments.192   
For example, one article argued against adopting the loss of 
chance doctrine because it would supposedly increase tort litigation 
and thus promote “defensive medicine,” causing doctors to 
“prescribe unnecessary tests, procedures, hospitalization, or 
                                                        
189 Geoff Boehm, Case Study, Debunking Medical Malpractice Myths: Unraveling 
the False Premises Behind “Tort Reform,” 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & 
ETHICS 357, 358–59 (2005) (describing a decline in the number of medical 
malpractice cases, and tort cases in general, filed per capita in the last ten years); 
Douglas A. Kysar et al., Medical Malpractice Myths and Realities: Why an 
Insurance Crisis is Not a Lawsuit Crisis, 39 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 785, 786–87 
(2006) (stating the reality of malpractice suits based on the empirical data is that 
their filing is “quite stable.”). 
190 See Boehm, supra note 189, at 358 (stating politicians, insurance industry 
executives, and medical society lobbyists are among the groups peddling 
misleading information about frivolous medical malpractice claims); Kysar, supra 
note 189, at 786 (“Insurance companies, managed-care organizations, doctors' 
associations, and other interest groups have heavily invested in media campaigns 
to convince policy-makers and the public that recent increases in malpractice 
insurance premiums have been caused by a civil justice system that too easily 
tolerates meritless malpractice claims.”). 
191 See Boehm, supra note 189, at 358  (“In particular, the insurance industry and 
other tort reform proponents rely on misinformation and largely anecdotal 
evidence that the civil justice system is “out of control” and needs to be scaled 
back.  However, the facts reveal a different picture.”); Kysar, supra note 189, at 
785–86 (“Unfortunately, the current debate over the civil justice system 
[especially by those advocating for medical malpractice reform] is characterized 
less by careful analysis than by unfounded claims, shrill rhetoric, and spurious 
anecdote.”); William M. Sage, Medical Malpractice Insurance and the Emperor’s 
Clothes, 54 DEPAUL L. REV. 463, 471 (2005) (recognizing the discrepancy 
between the arguments of opinion and the arguments of empirical evidence with 
respect to tort reform within medical malpractice). 
192 E.g., Kysar, supra note 189, at 787–88; Boehm, supra note 189, at 362–63 
(describing a study by the Office of Technology Assessment that found increased 
tort liability not to noticeably cause defensive medical practice, and thus not to 
noticeably increase medical costs). 
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prolonged hospitalization” in an attempt to avoid liability and 
thereby raising medical costs.193   
While this argument is plausible, the article failed to: (1) 
provide empirical evidence that the loss of chance doctrine 
meaningfully increases the number of tort claims; and (2) provide 
empirical evidence that increased liability causes defensive 
medicine. 194  However, in a different article that criticized many 
proponents of tort reform for this very reason—for making 
unsubstantiated accusations that tort litigation substantially increases 
medical costs—it provided and explained an empirical study 
conducted by the United States Congressional Office of Technology 
Assessment that debunked the concern of defensive medicine arising 
from increased tort litigation.195  Other studies corroborate the lack 
of evidence of defensive medicine impacting the cost of medical care 
from rising tort litigation.196 
 Overall, contrary to what some believe, tort liability has not 
“exploded”; in fact, contract claims—an area of law not targeted for 
reform—now outnumber tort claims. 197   This is perhaps due to 
“various checks and balances” already in place to limit frivolous                                                         
193 Lisa Perrochet et al., Lost Chance Recovery and the Folly of Expanding 
Medical Malpractice Liability, 27 TORT & INS. L.J. 615, 625 (1992). 
194 Id. (citing case studies that state the opinions of physician groups and 
malpractice insurers who believe physicians have incentives to engage in defensive 
medicine and offering no proof that physicians act on these incentives).  There is 
one study supporting the existence of increased hospital costs associated with 
defensive medicine that the Bush administration appeared to rely solely on in 
attempting to pass tort reform that was published in the Quarterly Journal of 
Economics.  Kysar, supra note 189, at 808.  However, the study involved elderly 
patients with two types of heart disease, and the United States Government 
Accountability Office stated in a report that “there is little empirical or analytical 
basis for generalizing the study’s limited findings to all patients throughout the 
entire nation in the manner that the researchers and the Bush administration did.”  
Id. at 808–09. 
195 See Boehm, supra note 189, at 362–63 (describing a study by the Office of 
Technology Assessment that concluded any defensive practice by doctors due to 
liability concerns were small, and the reduction of defensive practice would yield 
“very small” savings). 
196 See, e.g., Baicker, supra note 145, at 21 (“[T]here is little evidence of net 
increases in the use of treatments we studied in response to state-level increases in 
malpractice costs, although there may be some increase in screening procedure 
such as mammography.”) 
197 Kysar, supra note 189, at 801. 
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lawsuits, like sanctions for irresponsible lawyers and the existence 
and popularity of attorney compensation via contingency fees—that 
is, the plaintiff attorney has an incentive only to choose the most 
meritorious cases since the attorney only recovers payment if the 
case is won.198  
 In fact, one law review article that looked at the very 
relationship perhaps most salient to this article—whether adoption of 
the loss of opportunity doctrine increased the number of medical 
malpractice claims—found that no relationship existed between the 
doctrine and the number of claims being paid with medical 
malpractice insurance, and thus likely no relationship between the 
doctrine and the number of malpractice lawsuits being filed.199  In 
comparing the fluctuations in reported medical malpractice claims 
among the states both before and after adoption of the doctrine, the 
article concluded that any impact was negligible.200  Therefore, the 
evidence simply does not support the belief that adoption of the 
doctrine is causing dangerously high tort litigation,201 and therefore 
law should not be created under this predication.202 
2. Insurance Premiums 
 
Studies are consistent with the results of this note that 
adoption of the loss of opportunity doctrine does not significantly 
impact medical malpractice insurance premiums.CDS4  Even 
assuming that adoption of the loss of opportunity doctrine would 
meaningfully increase the number of malpractice suits filed, 
increased lawsuits and awards are not responsible for significant 
fluctuations in insurance premiums, despite “being frequently 
                                                        
198 Boehm, supra note 189, at 359. 
199 Koch, supra note 140, at 624 
200 Id. at 622. 
201 See Boehm, supra note 189, at 363. (“[F]ederal and state lawmakers, regulators, 
doctors, and the general public are being told by medical and insurance lobbyists 
that doctors' insurance rates are rising due to increasing claims by patients, rising 
jury verdicts, and exploding tort system costs in general, despite clear evidence to 
the contrary.”). 
202 See Kysar, supra note 189, at 786–87. 
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blamed for this.”203  One comprehensive Dartmouth study used data 
on malpractice claims from the NPDB and data on malpractice 
insurance premiums from the Medical Liability Monitor (“MLM”) to 
determine the relationship between medical malpractice claim 
payments and medical malpractice insurance premiums. 204   After 
careful analysis, the authors observed “a fairly weak relationship” 
between payments and premiums, indicating that other factors were 
at work.205  Although the study did not investigate other influences, 
it identified other factors from other studies that have been linked to 
rising insurance premiums, including: declining investment income, 
a less competitive insurance market, and increasing reinsurance 
rates.206  Other studies corroborate this finding.207 
Instead of blaming increased litigation for rapid increases in 
insurance premiums, insurance premiums appear to be based more 
on the overall economic climate. 208   That is because insurance 
providers rely on both insurance payments as well as investment 
capital to offset costs. 209  Because insurance providers hold onto 
revenue for many years before paying it out, the income on 
investments play more of a role in dictating premiums.210  Despite 
popular belief, it is the returns on investments like bonds—rather 
than receipts of premium payments—“that generate[] the bulk of                                                         
203 See Emily Chow, Health Courts: An Extreme Makeover of Medical 
Malpractice with Potentially Fatal Complications, 7 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & 
ETHICS 387, 465 (2007) (“Although malpractice litigation is frequently blamed for 
the current malpractice crisis, researchers have observed that there is no clear-cut 
correlation between trends in lawsuits and awards and trends in premiums or 
insurance liability.”); Sage, supra note 189, at 471 (“[T]he argument that each 
subsequent malpractice crisis [of surging insurance premiums] reflected surging 
litigiousness requiring legal restraint is false.”); Baicker, supra note 145, at 2, 21 
(finding based on a comprehensive empirical study that malpractice payments do 
not appear to be “a driving force” behind rising insurance premiums and therefore 
indirect and anecdotal evidence to the contrary “is quite misleading”). 
204 Baicker, supra note 145, at 8-9. 
205 Id. at 13. 
206 Id. at 2. 
207 E.g., Koch, supra note 140, at 625 (stating a “lack of apparent connection” 
between adoption of the doctrine and elevated malpractice insurance premium 
rates). 
208 Chow, supra note 203, at 415–16. 
209 Id. 
210 Id. at 416. 
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insurance-company profits.”211  In fact, insurance premiums increase 
most rapidly when the insurance company suffers the greatest 
losses. 212   This occurs with the existence of “short-sited pricing 
practices” when insurance providers set artificially low rates based 
on “unduly optimistic projections” of returns or in an “attempt to 
gain a larger market share,” causing it to eventually “boom-and-bust,” 
which is all part of the “underwriting cycle.”213  The false belief of 
the significant role that tort litigation plays in setting insurance 
premiums explains why attempts at tort reform have been largely 
unsuccessful in reducing insurance premium rates.214   
Furthermore, even if the loss of opportunity doctrine, 
contrary to evidence, had a substantial effect on insurance premiums, 
the concern that malpractice litigation is causing the high cost of 
health care in the United States is erroneous. 215  This is because 
malpractice litigation costs account for less than two percent of total 
countrywide health care spending.216  Therefore, even a significant 
decrease in insurance premium rates would do little to impact the 
overall health care spending.217   
Perhaps even more damning to the arguments of those 
opposing the loss of opportunity doctrine, for reasons relating to 
insurance premiums, is the fact that overall medical malpractice 
insurance premiums have actually been decreasing—not 




                                                         
211 Kysar, supra note 189, at 798. 
212 Id. at 798. 
213 Id. 
214 E.g., id. at 795–796 (describing the continued rise in insurance premiums 
following tort reform in Texas in 1995 as unsurprising). 
215 See Chow, supra note 203, at 417. 
216 Id.  
217 See id. (stating that even a twenty to thirty percent insurance savings would 
only have a “small direct impact” on health care spending). 
218 See, e.g., David Belk, It Ain’t the Lawyers: Medical Malpractice Costs Have 
Been Dropping, HUFFINGTON POST (Nov. 1, 2013, 12:03 PM), available at 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-belk/medical-malpractice-
costs_b_4171189.html. 
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VI. LIMITATIONS IN APPLICATION 
 
 This article asks the New Hampshire Legislature to 
reconsider its decision in refusing to adopt the loss of opportunity 
doctrine.  As demonstrated above, there is more than ample literature 
that supports this argument.  However, in the interest of providing a 
well-rounded evaluation of the doctrine, it is important to 
acknowledge its limitation in application.  Unfortunately, what one 
imagines in theory is not always what one experiences in practice.219   
Substituting the injury of death, for example, in place for the 
injury of the loss of opportunity, has its limitations.220  Because a 
death can easily be proven with a death certificate, while the loss of 
opportunity must be proven by complicated statistics involving 
estimates and speculation, application of the doctrine sometimes 
involves manipulation by attorneys and experts, which can lead to 
confusion of the jury.221 
Statistics can be manipulated by differing opinions of the 
significance of data and by altering the range of years, demographic, 
location, and size.222  Therefore, an attorney, regardless of the merits 
of the case, can simply “search for a willing witness” to convince the 
jury of his or her position.223  One case that relied on misleading 
statistics in recognizing the loss of chance was Falcon v. Memorial 
Hospital.224  In that case, the majority relied on the statistic provided                                                         
219 Shawn M. Nichols, Jorgenson v. Vener: The South Dakota Supreme Court 
Declares Loss-of-Chance Doctrine As Part of Our Common Law in Medical 
Malpractice Torts, 46 S.D. L. REV. 618, 638 (2001) (recognizing that while the 
doctrine has “redeemable qualities,” it is too complex for practical use). 
220 See id. 
221 Fennell v. Southern Maryland Hosp. Center, Inc., 580 A.2d 206, 213-14 (Md. 
1990) (“The use of statistics in trials is subject to criticism as being unreliable, 
misleading, easily manipulated, and confusing to a jury.  When large damage 
awards will be based on the statistical chance of survival before the negligent 
treatment, minus the statistical chance of survival after the negligent treatment, 
times the value of the lost life, we can imagine the bewildering sets of numbers 
with which the jury will be confronted, as well as the difficulties juries will have 
in assessing the comparative reliability of the divergent statistical evidence offered 
by each side.”). 
222 Michelle L. Truckor, The Loss of Chance Doctrine: Legal Recovery for 
Patients on the Edge of Survival, 24 U. DAYTON L. REV. 349, 364 (1999). 
223 Truckor, supra note 222, at 365. 
224 462 N.W.2d 44 (Mich. 1990). 
    
140          UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW        Vol. 13, No. 1  
     
140 
by the plaintiff’s expert that 37.5% of patients who develop an 
embolism survive with prompt treatment; however, in relying on this 
statistic, the majority did not consider the 25% chance of survival 
even without prompt treatment, decreasing the loss of chance from 
37.5 to 12.5%.225 
Further, the loss of opportunity can be confusing to a jury.226  
A death is concrete.  A jury can almost never mistake that this injury 
has occurred.  A loss of chance, however, is an “abstract” concept 
and can only be understood with the presentation of “complicated 
statistical data…[with the ability to] make a juror’s eyes glaze 
over.” 227   Under the loss of opportunity doctrine, a juror is 
challenged with the task of determining whether, more likely than 
not, the medical professional caused the loss of opportunity.228  This 
involves deciding whether a percentage decreased by a 
percentage229—maintaining the separation of these percentages is an 
innately confusing task for a lay jury, especially in medical 
malpractice cases, which often involve complicated and technical 
testimony and evidence.230  Keeping all of the various percentages 
straight is difficult “even for the most learned legal minds.”231  In 
fact, one article from the University of Texas School of Law devoted 
the entire piece to reviewing “several various blunders” that judges, 
lawyers, and commentators have made in attempting to apply the 
loss of opportunity doctrine.232  While there are limitations to the 
application of the doctrine, it stands to reason that, as courts become 
more familiar with the doctrine, application will become more 
seamless and courts will receive the full benefit of the doctrine. 
  
 
                                                         
225 Lars Noah, An Inventory of Mathematical Blunders in Applying the Loss-of-A-
Chance Doctrine, 24 REV. LITIG. 369, 378 (2005) (discussing Falcon, 462 N.W.2d 
at 59 (Riley, C.J., dissenting)). 
226 Nichols, supra note 219, at 642. 
227 See id. at 642-43; Perez v. Las Vegas Med. Ctr., 805 P.2d 589, 598 (Nev. 1991). 
228 Matsuyama, 890 N.E.2d at 832. 
229 See id.  
230 Nichols, supra note 219, at 642. 
231 Id. 
232 Noah, supra note 225, at 370. 
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Although a “reflexive response” to the loss of opportunity 
doctrine 233 is that it is dangerous in that it expands tort liability, 
destroys the traditional conceptualization of tort law, and leads to 
higher medical costs and thus lower medical care affordability—
upon closer inspection—this initial reaction is largely unfounded.  
Instead of having a harmful effect, the loss of opportunity appears to 
provide some protection for patients with less than a fifty-one 
percent chance of survival but only allows for recovery up to the 
amount the jury finds the doctor caused by a preponderance of the 
evidence.234  That is quite similar to traditional tort law.  Further, 
there has been almost no evidence of a willingness to expand the loss 
of opportunity doctrine to other contexts, despite the adoption by 
some states like New York roughly 40 years ago.235  The doctrine 
truly appears to be uniquely appropriate for medical malpractice 
cases.   
Last—and perhaps most importantly—while the concern of 
the New Hampshire Legislature in abrogating the decision by the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court seemed to be made with the best 
interests of its citizens in mind, statistics do not support its concerns.  
Given the research of this law review note, and those of several other 
corroborating studies, other powerful factors are responsible for 
spikes in insurance premiums.  With premium rates lower across the 
United States in years, and with roughly one half of the States 
having adopted the doctrine, perhaps New Hampshire should take a 
second look at adoption of the loss of opportunity doctrine.  While 
practice-based concerns exist, these concerns will likely abate as 
courts become more familiar with the application of the doctrine. 
 
 
                                                        
233 Koch, supra note 140, at 638. 
234 See Lord, 770 A.2d at 1105. 
235 See Kallenberg, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 510–11.  
